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Objectives: converging research suggests that mindfulness training exerts its therapeutic
effects on depression by reducing rumination. Theoretically, rumination is a multifaceted
construct that aggregates multiple neurocognitive aspects of depression, including poor
executive control, negative and overgeneral memory bias, and persistence or stickiness of
negative mind states. Current measures of rumination, most-often self-reports, do not cap-
ture these different aspects of ruminative tendencies, and therefore are limited in providing
detailed information about the mechanisms of mindfulness. Methods: we developed new
insight into the potential mechanisms of rumination, based on three model-based metrics
of free recall dynamics. These three measures reflect the patterns of memory retrieval of
valenced information: the probability of first recall (Pstart) which represents initial affective
bias, the probability of staying with the same valence category rather than switching, which
indicates strength of positive or negative association networks (Pstay), and probability of
stopping (Pstop) or ending recall within a given valence, which indicates persistence or
stickiness of a mind state. We investigated the effects of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive
Therapy (MBCT; N =29) vs. wait-list control (N =23) on these recall dynamics in a ran-
domized controlled trial in individuals with recurrent depression. Participants completed
a standard laboratory stressor, the Trier Social Stress Test, to induce negative mood and
activate ruminative tendencies. Following that, participants completed a free recall task
consisting of three word lists. This assessment was conducted both before and after
treatment or wait-list. Results: while MBCT participant’s Pstart remained relatively sta-
ble, controls showed multiple indications of depression-related deterioration toward more
negative and less positive bias. Following the intervention, MBCT participants decreased
in their tendency to sustain trains of negative words and increased their tendency to sus-
tain trains of positive words. Conversely, controls showed the opposite tendency: controls
stayed in trains of negative words for longer, and stayed in trains of positive words for
less time relative to pre-intervention scores. MBCT participants tended to stop recall less
often with negative words, which indicates less persistence or stickiness of negatively
valenced mental context. Conclusion: MBCT participants showed a decrease in patterns
that may perpetuate rumination on all three types of recall dynamics (Pstart, Pstay, and
Pstop), compared to controls. MBCT may weaken the strength of self-perpetuating neg-
ative associations networks that are responsible for the persistent and “sticky” negative
mind states observed in depression, and increase the positive associations that are lacking
in depression.This study also offers a novel, objective method of measuring several indices
of ruminative tendencies indicative of the underlying mechanisms of rumination.
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INTRODUCTION
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a debilitating mood disorder
that affects almost 19 million adults in the USA at any given time
(Regier et al., 1998) and almost 20% of the USA population over a
lifetime (Blazer et al., 1994; Kessler et al., 2005). MDD is recurrent
and progressive, with the likelihood of recurrence exceeding 80%
(Judd, 1997; Mueller et al., 1999).
Neurobiological models characterize depression as insufficient
top-down modulation by the prefrontal cortex (PFC), a condition
known as “hypofrontality” (Drevets, 2001; Davidson et al., 2002;
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Ochsner et al., 2002; Siegle et al., 2002, 2007b; Ochsner and Gross,
2005; Johnstone et al., 2007). Hypofrontality can result in multiple
manifestations of depression, including biological, emotional, and
cognitive. On the biological level, a weak PFC results in a hyper-
active amygdala (Siegle and Hasselmo, 2002; Siegle et al., 2007b),
and an increase in sympathetic hyperarousal and high levels of
cortisol (for a review, see Jindal et al., 2003), resulting in damage
to the hippocampus (Sheline et al., 1996, 1999; Bremner et al.,
2000; Mervaala et al., 2000; Steffens et al., 2011).
Hippocampal deficits are reflected by impaired recall of spe-
cific verbal episodic material (i.e., autobiographical memory;
Wolkowitz et al., 1990). While on the one hand, high levels of corti-
sol impair explicit verbal memory (Newcomer et al., 1999) and the
specific details of life events, high levels of cortisol also enhance
memory for negatively valenced emotional material (Buchanan
and Lovallo, 2001). The result is negatively valenced, emotionally
thematic, overgeneral “narrative smoothing,” a process by which
preserved fragments of memory are unified by a common theme
that omits specific non-congruent details (Heuer and Reisberg,
1990; Burke et al., 1992).
On the cognitive level, depression and hypofrontality are associ-
ated with over general autobiographical memory (Williams, 1996;
Williams et al., 2000), all caused by poor prefrontal control over
the amygdala (Fales et al., 2008; Beevers et al., 2010; Cisler and
Koster, 2010) and impairment of the hippocampus (Payne et al.,
2004). Poor prefrontal control is associated with deficits in exec-
utive function, especially cognitive set shifting, or the ability to
disengage from a particular mind-set (Austin et al., 1999). Impair-
ment in this ability, often called“cognitive control,” is a hallmark of
depression vulnerability (for a review, see Hertel, 1997; Gotlib and
Joormann, 2010; Joormann and D’Avanzato, 2010). Poor cognitive
control commonly manifests as uncontrolled, repetitive or perse-
verative behavior and thinking (Hertel, 1998; Watkins and Brown,
2002; Watkins and Mason, 2002; Ward et al., 2003; Martin and
Tesser, 2006), often referred to as mental “stickiness” (Joormann
et al., 2011).
On the emotional level, poor prefrontal control and a hyperac-
tive amygdala are associated with biases in attention and memory
away from positive stimuli and toward negative stimuli (Burt et al.,
1995; Mathews and MacLeod, 2005; Kellough et al., 2008; Disner
et al., 2011) and persistent negative affect and high emotional reac-
tivity in response to stress (Baxter et al., 1989; Bench et al., 1993;
Mayberg et al., 1999; Davidson et al., 2000; Pine et al., 2001; Clark
et al., 2002; Siegle and Hasselmo, 2002; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003;
Meyer et al., 2004; Siegle et al., 2007b; Liu et al., 2012).
Importantly the duration or persistence of negative affect
appears to be more associated with depression risk than negative
affect intensity (Cohen et al., 2005; Gillihan et al., 2010). Indi-
viduals with longer durations of negative affect following daily
life stressors are more likely to develop depressive symptoms than
those who recover more quickly (Cohen et al., 2005). As a result,
the persistence or “stickiness” (Joormann et al., 2011) of negative
affect has become a central target of interventions. While negative
affect in depressed individuals is very sticky, they have a reduced
capacity to sustain positive emotion (Heller et al., 2009). This leads
to an overall deficit in positive affect (Watson and Clark, 1988).
Thus, effective treatment strategies for depression should target
decreasing negative affective persistence and increasing positive
affect persistence.
This specific profile of neuropsychological impairments is
referred to as “rumination.” It consists of an excessive, repeti-
tive, and uncontrolled stream of negatively valenced thoughts and
memories that are linked to each other by a common theme (often
loss, failure, inadequacy, etc.), that is activated by stress or nega-
tive affect. Rumination has been consistently linked with risk of
developing depression (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993;
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994), or exacerbating current depression
(De Raedt and Koster, 2010) and has therefore been a therapeu-
tic target for interventions. While disorder-specific definitions
vary (Ehring and Watkins, 2008), their essential features indi-
cate that rumination is a cognitive activity that is (a) repetitive,
(b) uncontrolled, and (c) negatively valenced (McLaughlin and
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011).
Rumination scores have been related to overgenerality of auto-
biographical memories by depressive patients (Heeren and Philip-
pot, 2011), suggesting that the trains of ruminative thoughts are
driven by a common unifying theme that reinforces itself by com-
mon (negative) content and by deflecting non-congruent (neu-
tral) information (Whitmer and Banich, 2007). Joormann et al.
(2011, p. 982) reflect that “ruminators become stuck on recurrent
thoughts that revolve around a specific theme and have difficulty
flexibly switching to a new train of thought; such persevera-
tion may reflect difficulties manipulating information in working
memory.” This cognitive inflexibility may lead people to become
stuck in a particular mind-set (Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis, 1999).
Recent research in rumination is increasingly investigating the role
of prefrontally mediated cognitive control (Demeyer et al., 2012),
especially the ability to manipulate emotional information held in
working memory (Koster et al., 2011; De Lissnyder et al., 2012).
Given the prominent role of the hypofrontality across psychi-
atric conditions, many researchers have attempted to use attention
training to improve prefrontal control (Wells, 2000; Penades et al.,
2006; Siegle et al., 2007a; O’Connell et al., 2008). A large body
of research supports the use of meditation-based mental train-
ing as a candidate for strengthening or rehabilitating prefrontal
attentional control systems. For example, different forms of med-
itation practice have been associated with better performance on
a wide range of prefrontally mediated attention tasks (Valentine
and Sweet, 1999; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Brefczynski-Lewis et al.,
2007; Chan and Woollacott, 2007; Jha et al., 2007; Pagnoni and
Cekic, 2007; Slagter et al., 2007; Srinivasan and Baijal, 2007; Tang
et al., 2007; Chambers et al., 2008; Bushell, 2009; Lutz et al., 2009;
Goldin and Gross, 2010), with increased activity in the (lateral)
PFC (Herzog et al., 1990; Jevning et al., 1996; Khushu et al., 2000;
Lazar et al., 2000; Baerentsen et al., 2001; Newberg et al., 2001;
Ritskes et al., 2003; Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Creswell et al.,
2007; Farb et al., 2007, 2010; Hölzel et al., 2007), larger volumes of
frontal gray matter (Lazar et al., 2005; Pagnoni and Cekic, 2007;
Hölzel et al., 2008; Luders et al., 2009) and hippocampus (Hölzel
et al., 2008; Luders et al., 2009), and greater PFC inhibition of
the amygdala (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Creswell et al., 2007;
Farb et al., 2007; Goldin and Gross, 2010; Hölzel et al., 2010).
In terms of emotions, meditation training techniques have been
found to decrease levels of negative affect, anxiety and depression
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(Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992; Speca et al., 2000; Grossman et al., 2004;
Shapiro et al., 2005; Jain et al., 2007; Kenny and Williams, 2007;
Kuyken et al., 2008; Witek-Janusek et al., 2008) as well as decreased
emotional reactivity (Arch and Craske, 2006, 2010; Ortner et al.,
2007; Tang et al., 2007; Proulx, 2008; Brewer et al., 2009; Pace et al.,
2009; Raes et al., 2009; Goldin and Gross, 2010).
On the cognitive level, meditation training has also been asso-
ciated with changes in information processing such as decreases
in the overgenerality of memory (Williams et al., 2000; Heeren
et al., 2009; Heeren and Philippot, 2011) and negative biases in
attention (Garland et al., 2009; Vago and Nakamura, 2011) and
memory (Alberts and Thewissen, 2011), as well as increased effi-
ciency of positive information processing (Roberts-Wolfe et al.,
2012).
It is therefore not surprising that meditation has been used
as a treatment for rumination. Teasdale et al. (1995) theorized
that mindfulness interrupts the elaborative processes that fuel
rumination and maintain negative mood, a hypothesis that is
gaining empirical support (Heeren and Philippot, 2011). Mind-
fulness meditation (MM) has been associated with reductions in
self-reported rumination scores (Ramel et al., 2004; Jain et al.,
2007; Kingston et al., 2007; Shahar et al., 2010; Heeren and Philip-
pot, 2011), and this has been proposed as the mechanism through
which mindfulness decreases psychological distress (Heeren and
Philippot, 2011). Furthermore, self-reported trait mindfulness
scores were found to be inversely correlated with self-reported
rumination (Mathew et al., 2010).
While rumination nicely aggregates the various cognitive, affec-
tive, and neurobiological impairments in depression, the research
on meditation and rumination is limited in several ways. First, the
most-often used measure of rumination, the Ruminative Response
Scale (RRS) of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-
Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991) has also been subject to much
scrutiny, as has the whole multifaceted construct of rumination
(McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). Other scales, like the
Cambridge-Exeter Rumination Thinking Scale (Barnard et al.,
2007a) represent improvements in construct validity, but are still
subject to the limitations of all self-report measures. Self-report
scales in general are inherently problematic, and prone to demand
characteristics. This is especially true in meditation studies where
the intervention itself may change how aware participants are of
what is happening within their minds. Second, despite the abun-
dance of objective neurobiological and neuropsychological data
in the research on meditation, the research related to rumina-
tion consists almost entirely of self-report data, and there have
been no detailed psychological or neurobiological mechanistic
models of how meditation affects rumination. Third, while infor-
mation processing bias (toward negative and away from positive)
has been addressed in meditation research, less emphasis has
been put on features of rumination that reflect its horizontal
time course: repetition and uncontrollability. The horizontal time
course of emotional responses, or “affective chronometry” has
received considerable attention (Davidson et al., 2000). Depres-
sion and rumination are not problematic simply because they
are negative, but because they are persistent, self-perpetuating,
and “sticky” or difficult to disengage from Joormann et al.
(2011).
Research indicates that it is the increased duration of negative
affect following a stressor, rather than the intensity, that is asso-
ciated with depression risk (Cohen et al., 2005; Gillihan et al.,
2010). Similarly, a recent study in our lab found that mindfulness
training was associated with decreased duration (not amplitude)
of negative affect in response to a laboratory stressor, and that
this decrease mediated the effects of mindfulness training on
depressive symptoms (Britton et al., 2012).
And finally, rumination refers generally to a non-specific kind
of “thinking” that includes both feelings and memories, but more
recent research has focused on rumination in relation to mem-
ory (Williams, 1996; Williams and Swales, 2004; Raes et al., 2006;
Moulds et al., 2007; Joormann et al., 2011). Rumination and
deficits in episodic memory, including overgenerality, are highly
correlated and thought to be part of the same mood-congruent
memory process (Watkins and Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Raes et al.,
2006; Barnard et al., 2007b; Heeren and Philippot, 2011). For
example, Watkins (2002) reflects that “As a depressed person
ruminates on unpleasant information, they are engaging in mood-
congruent conceptual elaboration. Not only does this make the
information more available to both explicit and implicit retrieval,
elaborating this information in a mood-congruent fashion should
also serve to enhance explicit and implicit retrieval of information
related to this material” (Watkins, 2002, p. 398). More recent mod-
els have considered rumination to be tightly associated with the
ability to manipulate emotional information in working memory
(Joormann et al., 2011; Demeyer et al., 2012).
This paper attempts to address some of these gaps by inves-
tigating the effects of MM training on an objective neuropsy-
chological measure of memory retrieval. Since rumination is
defined as repetitive, uncontrolled, and persistent retrieval of
negatively valenced and thematically unified memories, memory
retrieval seems to be the central component of this process. Thank-
fully, detailed computational models exist of memory retrieval
that can be used to make specific predictions about the type
of retrieval patterns that are associated with rumination. Such
retrieval patterns should capture not only overall emotional bias,
but also the persistence or “stickiness” of negative mind states
that are observed in rumination. Specifically, cognitive inflexibil-
ity or stickiness is reflected in long chains of negatively valenced
information, whereas cognitive flexibility or cognitive control
is reflected in the ability to disengage from negative trains of
thought,which can manifest as both shorter negative trains, and/or
longer positive ones. In this way we can assess whether mindful-
ness improves mental stickiness through better cognitive control,
and/or a change in the relative strength of negative and positive
association networks.
These concepts can be formalized with“recall dynamics,”which
refer to distinct patterns of memory retrieval that have been
described by the Temporal Context Model (TCM; Howard and
Kahana, 2002) and Context Maintenance and Retrieval (CMR)
model (Polyn et al., 2009). During free recall, participants recall
words in any order without external cues (Moscovitch, 1994; Stuss
et al., 1994; Gershberg and Shimamura, 1995; Becker and Lim,
2003), and the order of recall reveals internally driven organiza-
tion schemes that drive memory search. Recall dynamics describe
how participants proceed from one recall to the next, which
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is related to how the connection strengths between memories
in their neural networks are configured (Kahana, 1996; Nel-
son et al., 2004; Tse, 2009). Organization of recall provides a
window into the way people search through their memory and
construct trains of thought (e.g., Howard and Kahana, 2002;
Kahana and Miller, 2011). The order of recall is driven by an
internally maintained contextual or preexisting semantic or the-
matic commonality among to-be-remembered items. For exam-
ple, words that are unified by a common theme, such as negative
valence, will be strongly associated with each other and therefore
recalled consecutively (e.g., “failure,” “loser” “misery” “sad” – see
Figure 1), a phenomenon known as semantic clustering (Kahana
and Miller, 2011). The length of the train of negative words
can yield information about the strength of the negative asso-
ciation network. The length of valence trains and pattern of
transitions between positive, negative, and neutral words also
reflects the strength of prefrontal control. This is because the
prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in recall dynamics (Becker
and Lim, 2003) as it controls the internal representations that
organize recall (Polyn and Kahana, 2008) and is also respon-
sible for switching to new organization schemes (Rudy et al.,
2005).
FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of recall dynamics.Words are
consecutively recalled are displayed vertically. Negatively valenced words
are marked by a black sphere with a “−”, while positively valenced words
are marked with a “+”. The vertical lines between valence signs indicates
the strength of the association (i.e., heavier lines denote stronger
associations).
In this study, we used three types of recall dynamics (probability
of first recall, recall transitions, and probability of stopping, Pstop;
Kahana, 2012) to describe the potential mechanisms underlying
rumination. To be able to do this, we adapted their definitions to
focus on the valence of the words, rather than their serial posi-
tion, which is usually considered. The “probability of first recall”
(Pstart; Hogan, 1975) then describes the valence of words at the
beginning of recall which gives a window into the initial affec-
tive state of a given participant (Tulving and Donaldson, 1972).
Participants start recall by retrieving an item consistent with their
current mental state (Howard and Kahana, 2002). As such, a par-
ticipant experiencing a negative affective state is more likely to
remember a negative word from the list. If mindfulness training
decreases overall negative bias in response to a stressor, we expect
to see decreased probability of recalling a negatively valenced word
as the first word after experiencing this stressor.
“Recall transitions” describe how often people transition from
one category of word to another (Howard and Kahana, 1999;
Kahana, 2000). In the context of affective word lists, this would
mean counting how often people make transitions from one
valence category to another (similar to Polyn et al., 2009 who
used this method for non-affective categories). Long trains of
negative words indicate a strong network of negative associations,
while shorter negative trains indicate both weaker associations and
greater ability to disengage from negative information (i.e., pre-
frontal control). If mindfulness training decreases the strength of
negatively valenced associations, or improves set shifting ability,
we expect mindfulness-trained participants to stay with trains of
negative words for shorter periods.
“Pstop” is the probability that a given item is the last item
recalled, and it therefore increases with each subsequent item
recalled. Pstop thus differs from Pstart in that it measures what
the mental context has drifted toward when memories have been
exhausted, rather than the mental context from which recall starts.
If mindfulness decreases the persistence or stickiness of nega-
tive mental contexts, we expect mindfulness-trained participants
decrease in their probability of ending recall with a negative
valence word (Forgas and Bower, 1987).
We tested these hypotheses in a sample of partially remit-
ted depressed patients who were randomized to either 8 weeks
of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) or a wait-list
control. Following a standard laboratory stressor, the Trier Social
Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993) as a negative mood
induction to activate ruminative tendencies (Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008), participants completed a free recall task consisting
of three word lists, both before and after treatment or wait-list.
Specifically, we hypothesized that after the intervention: (1)
MBCT-trained participants are less likely than controls to start
off recall with a negatively valenced word (2) MBCT-trained par-
ticipants persist in recalling trains of positively valenced words
for longer periods, and in recalling trains of negatively valenced
words for shorter periods, reflecting decreased strength of nega-
tive associations, and increased strength of positive associations
within the MBCT group compared to controls. (3) MBCT-trained
participants are less likely to finish their recall with a negative
word, reflecting a decreased tendency of this group to get stuck in
negative mind states.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants (N = 52) were individuals with a recurrent form
of unipolar depression in partial or full remission with varying
degrees of residual symptoms (see Britton et al., 2012, for details).
Structured Clinical Exclusion criteria included (a) a history of
bipolar disorder, cyclothymia, schizophrenia, or other psychotic
disorders, persistent antisocial behavior or repeated self-harm,
borderline personality disorder, organic brain damage, (b) cur-
rent panic, obsessive-compulsive disorder, eating disorder, or sub-
stance abuse/dependence, (c) inability to read/write in English, (d)
current psychotherapy, or (e) a regular meditation practice. Indi-
viduals on antidepressants were permitted to participate as long
as they reported no change in medication type or dose during the
3 months prior to enrollment or during the active phase of the
study.
SELF-REPORT MEASURES
Depressive symptoms were measured by the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck and Steer, 1987). The BDI is a widely used
measure of depressive symptoms and has excellent psychometric
properties (Beck et al., 1988). The BDI had an internal consistency
coefficient of 0.81 before treatment and 0.90 at post-treatment.
Rumination
The 22-item RRS of the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow,
1991) was used to measure changes in self-reported rumination.
In this sample, the internal consistency coefficient was 0.88 at both
pre- and post-treatment.
Anxiety and negative affect
The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory form Y (STAI-Y1;
Spielberger et al., 1983) is a 20-item self-report inventory where
respondents rate their current levels of negative affect on a four-
point Likert scale. In the current sample, internal consistency
ranged from 0.89 to 0.93. The STAI was completed before and
after the TSST (see Britton et al., 2012). In this report, the STAI is
used to demonstrate the efficacy of our negative mood induction
procedure.
LABORATORY BASED MEASURES
Trier social stress test
Before doing the recall task, participants underwent a TSST. The
TSST is a procedure that reliably produces moderate psycholog-
ical distress in laboratory settings (Kirschbaum et al., 1993). A
full description of the TSST can be found in Britton et al. (2012).
Briefly, subjects prepared and delivered a speech, followed by an
oral subtraction task in front of a panel of judges, stage lights, and
cameras. We used the TSST to induce self-evaluation and negative
affect that would make rumination more probable and enduring
and to magnify the recall bias of depressive patients toward nega-
tive words (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). This negative recall bias
is expected because TSST causes an increase in stress (Kirschbaum
et al., 1992; Williams et al., 2004), and an increase in stress has
be shown to cause impairments in the recall of positive and neu-
tral words even for non-depressed individuals (Kirschbaum et al.,
1996; Tops et al., 2003), and increase in recall of negative valence
words (Abercrombie et al., 2003) and in rumination (e.g., Roger
and Najarian, 1998).
Free recall task
Participants were presented with three lists of 22 words, six positive
(normative valence= 7.5± 0.40, arousal= 5.8± 0.80), six nega-
tive (valence= 2.6± 0.73, arousal= 5.5± 1.37), and six neutral
words (valence= 5.18± 0.34, arousal= 3.84± 0.48). Four neutral
buffer words appeared at the beginning and end of each list to con-
trol for primacy and recency effects and were excluded from the
analysis. Words were block-randomized with no words of the same
valence appearing consecutively. Lists were balanced for valence,
arousal, length, and frequency of appearance in the English lan-
guage. Based on the suggestions of Koster et al. (2010) to assess
multiple modalities in the same subject to confirm that the findings
are not limited to any one form of processing, subjects received two
visually presented lists separated by an aurally presented list. Visual
lists were presented in white font on a black or red background, and
aurally presented lists were delivered at a volume level set by partic-
ipants. Stimuli were presented on a 15-inch computer screen using
DMDX software (Forster and Forster, 2003). Words were shown
for 6 s each, followed by a 500-ms blank screen. Two separate sets
of lists were counterbalanced for pre- and post-treatment admin-
istration. Participants rated each word (1–9) on the dimensions
of pleasantness and arousal to ensure depth of encoding. Imme-
diately after this encoding phase, participants were asked to recall
these words in any order in an incidental memory test. Recall did
not differ between visual vs. aural presentation so all three lists are
collapsed for the analyses to maximize statistical power. Time is
coded as T1 (before the MBCT program or wait-list) and T2 (after
the MBCT program or wait-list).
PROCEDURE
After completion of baseline assessments, participants were block-
randomized (block size= 5) to a MBCT program or wait-list
control condition in a 3:2 ratio without reference (stratification)
to baseline characteristics, using identical, shuffled, opaque, sealed
envelopes (Doig and Simpson, 2005). After 8 weeks of treatment or
wait-list condition, participants completed a post-treatment ques-
tionnaire packet and returned to the laboratory for assessment.
All self-report measures and tasks were administered by personnel
that was blinded to the treatment condition (MBCT vs. control)
of the participants (see Britton et al., 2012, for details). The exper-
iments were conducted between May 2004 and December 2005 at
the University of Arizona, Department of Psychology in Tucson,
Arizona. The study protocol was approved by the University of
Arizona Institutional Review Board, and all participants provided
written informed consent. No adverse events occurred during the
trial.
INTERVENTION – MINDFULNESS-BASED COGNITIVE THERAPY
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (Segal et al., 2002, 2004;
Teasdale, 2004) is an 8-week group-based intervention that com-
bines principles from cognitive-behavioral therapy (Beck et al.,
1979) and Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-
Zinn, 1990) using a psycho-educational and client-centered for-
mat. MBCT sessions focus on cultivating mindfulness or non-
judgmental present-moment awareness of mental content and
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everyday activities. Homework assignments consist of practicing
MM exercises with the aid of a guided audio CD. A session-by-
session description with handouts and homework assignments is
available in the MBCT manual (Segal et al., 2002). Sessions were
conducted by the last author who had more than 10 years of mind-
fulness practice experience and has received extensive training
in delivery of the program through the Center for Mindfulness
MBSR Instructor Certification Program at University of Massa-
chusetts Medical School, and through MBCT training with Dr.
Zindel Segal, the first author of the MBCT manual. According
to Segal et al. (2002), mindfulness training breaks the high level
thematically driven elaboration of repetitive negative thoughts by
redirecting focus to a lower level, concrete focus (body sensations).
Analysis methods
The self-report measures, as well as the mean number of recalls,
were analyzed with standard repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA), with factors treatment group (MBCT vs. control),
and time (before vs. after the MBCT program). Because of the lim-
ited number of lists per participant, and the inappropriateness of
ANOVAs for probabilities (Jaeger, 2008) we used non-parametric
permutation analogs of ANOVAs for assessing free recall dynam-
ics. Because outliers have very little effect on non-parametric
permutation tests, we did not remove any outliers from the data.
We examined three measures of free recall dynamics: the prob-
ability of first recall (Pstart), Pstop, and probability of staying
rather than switching (Kahana, 2012), which we adapted to study
the effects of valence on recall dynamics. Because of the limited
number of lists per participant, we combined the data from all
participants. Pstart is defined in our design with three affective
categories as the probability that a participant starts recall with an
item from that valence category. Similarly, Pstop is the probability
that a participant will stop after recalling an item of a particular
affective category. Response transitions were analyzed in terms of
the probability of continuing recalling within a specific valence
category (i.e., staying rather than switching).
For every recall dynamics measure (i.e., probability of first
recall, probability of staying, Pstop), we determined p-values with a
permutation procedure (Wasserman, 2004). In this procedure, the
labels of treatment and time point were randomly swapped, and
the probabilities were recomputed, for 1000 iterations (changing
the number of iterations did not affect our results). This created
a permutation distribution for the null hypothesis of no effect of
treatment and time point. The p-value was the probability of the
empirical recall dynamics measure compared to the permutation
distribution of recall dynamics measures. Permutation analogs
of ANOVA were implemented by subtracting the conditions of
interest, repeating the subtraction for the randomized data, and
computing where the empirical recall dynamics measure fell in the
corresponding permutation distribution (Hesterberg et al., 2005).
These statistical tests were implemented in Matlab (Mathworks,
Inc., Natick, MA, USA).
RESULTS
PARTICIPANT FLOW AND COMPLIANCE
Of the 52 participants that completed baseline assessments,
23 were randomized to wait-list control and 29 to MBCT.
Twenty-six (90%) MBCT and 19 (82%) wait-listed participants
completed all assessments (total N = 45). Outside of class, the
26 completers reported engaging in formal MM practice an
average of 39.94± 10 min/day, 5.2± 1.2 days/week. According to
the goal of 45 min/day, 6 days/week of formal MM practice
(270 min/week= 100%), the average number meditation minutes
across all weeks was 76± 24% with a range of 79–308 min/week.
MANIPULATION CHECK: TSST RELIABLY INDUCES NEGATIVE AFFECT
We conducted a series of analyses to evaluate the effective-
ness of the TSST in producing negative affect/anxiety, and to
assess whether repeated administration led to an attenuated
response (i.e., habituation). Using the change between baseline
and the report of anxiety during the speech, the TSST pro-
duced a significant increase in anxiety for all participants at
both pre- [t (44)= 7.5, p< 0.001 η2p = 0.55] and post-treatment
[t (44)= 5.9, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.44]. There was no attenuation in
the peak level of anxiety produced by the TSST from pre- to
post-treatment assessment [STAI score during speech at pre-
treatment= 53.4± 10.9, at post-treatment= 50.7± 11.12, main
effect of time, F(1, 42)= 2.3, p= 0.14].
SELF-REPORT MEASURES
Baseline scores for all these measures are reported in Table 1.
Depression
As expected, MBCT treatment was successful; we found a signifi-
cant decrease in BDI over time [M time1= 9.1, M time2= 6.5, F(1,
42)= 6.6, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.14], with a trend toward a significant
effect of group [F(1, 42)= 3.2, p= 0.08, η2p = 0.07] and a signifi-
cant interaction between time and group [F(1, 42)= 6.0, p< 0.05,
η2p = 0.13]. The interaction indicates that the treatment effect is
larger for the MBCT group than for the control group.
Rumination
There was a significant group× time interaction [F(1, 42)= 13.3,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.24], suggesting a pattern of decreased self-
reported rumination for the MBCT group in comparison to
controls.
STAI anxiety
As previously reported in Britton et al. (2012), a significant group
x time interaction indicated that TSST-related anxiety decreased
more than controls in the MBCT group [F(1, 42)= 6.2, p< 0.05,
η2p = 0.13].
Table 1 | Baseline measures.
Mean (SD)T1 MinimumT1 MaximumT1
Age 46.6 (7.8) 47.1 (12.3) 25 24 59 64
%Female 76.9 (43.0) 93.8 (25.0) – – – –
BDI 9.1 (6.1) 9.0 (5.7) 0 2 21 21
RRS 51.3 (9.7) 47.9 (11.9) 35 34 67 68
STAI 40.0 (11.7) 40.7 (9.3) 20 27 62 63
SES, socio-economic status; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; RRS, rumination
response scale; STAI, Spielberger Trait Anxiety Questionnaire.
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WORD RECALL
Overall recall
Participants recalled on average 43.6% of the words at T1 and
48.4% at T2. Recall accuracy improved from T1 to T2 [F(1,
42)= 547.5, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.93] but did not differ by group.
We then compared the average recall probabilities for the three
different valence categories (Table 2). Participants recalled more
positive, negative, and neutral words at T2 than at T1 [F(1,
42)> 236, p< 0.001, η2p > 0.85], indicating they improved on the
task through practice. There were no main effects of treatment or
interactions between time and treatment on the average number
of words recalled.
RECALL DYNAMICS
Probability of first recall
The probability of first recall (Pstart) gives a window into what the
mental context is of the participant (Tulving and Donaldson, 1972)
at the time of the start of recall. People start recall by cuing with
the current mental context (Howard and Kahana, 2002), which
results in the retrieval of items that share elements with this con-
textual state. For an affectively negative mental context, negative
valence items will be preferentially retrieved from memory. While
MBCT’s Pstart remained relatively stable from T1 to T2, controls
showed multiple indications of deterioration (Figure 2). Specif-
ically, controls showed an increased probability of starting recall
with a negative word (p< 0.05; see also Table 3) and a decreased
probability of starting with a positive word (p< 0.05).
Table 2 | Mean percentage of recalled words by valence category,









We then asked how participants transition between list items. In
essence, recall transitions say something about how participants’
trains of thoughts develop over the course of recall, and in the
case of affective words, about the strength of associations between
words of a specific valence category. Transitions can be quantified
with the probability of persisting in recalling words of a particular
valence category, rather than switching to a different valence cate-
gory. Significant group-by-time interactions indicate that MBCT
participants increased more than controls in their tendency to
make transitions from positive to positive words, and decreased
more than controls in their tendency to make negative to nega-
tive transitions (Figure 3). From T1 to T2, positive associations
became increasingly more available for recall MBCT participants
(p< 0.001; see also Table 3), but less available for recall for con-
trols (p< 0.001). Conversely, the strength of negative associations
decreased for the MBCT group (p< 0.001), but increased for the
control group.
Probability of stopping
Whereas Pstart reflects the participant’s mental context at the start
of the recall episode, Pstop indexes the mental context toward
which the participant drifts over the course of the recall process
(Sederberg et al., 2008) and thus is an indicator of the persistence
or stickiness of that context or mental state. A strong network of
negative associations will reinforce itself, and make it more difficult
retrieve positive words (Forgas and Bower, 1987).
A trend toward a significant group and time interaction
(p= 0.07; see also Table 3) for negative words (see Figure 4) indi-
cates that the MBCT group decreased more than the control group
in their tendency to end recall with a negative word. Indeed, the
probability of ending with a negative word decreased significantly
for the MBCT (p< 0.05), but increased for controls. The prob-
ability of ending on a positive word increased at the trend level
(p= 0.07) for MBCTs but not for controls.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We examined for the first time model-based measures of recall






































FIGURE 2 | (A,B) Changes in probability of first recall from T1 to T2 by valence category (A: positive; B: negative). *p<0.05.
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rumination. We investigated the effects of MBCT vs. wait-list con-
trol on these recall dynamics in a RCT in individuals with recur-
rent depression. We found that all three types of recall dynamics
(probability of first recall, recall transitions, and Pstop) indicate
an improvement in tendencies conducive to rumination follow-
ing MBCT compared to controls. We discuss the results of each
measure of recall dynamics below.
PROBABILITY OF FIRST RECALL
The valence of the first words recalled indicates the initial affective
bias of the mind state that results from having just experienced the
TSST. While MBCT’s Pstart remained relatively stable, controls
showed multiple indications of depression-related deterioration
toward more negative and less positive bias.
RECALL TRANSITIONS
The likelihood of staying or switching out of a given valence
category indicates the strength of associations within that cate-
gory. For example, long trains of negative words indicate a strong
negative network of negative associations, whereas a short train
Table 3 | Statistics for permutation tests of changes in recall dynamics
betweenT1 andT2 (Pstart), for the two groups, and for the interaction
between group and time (**p<0.001; *p<0.05;†p<0.1).












indicates the tendency to switch to another (non-negative) cate-
gory. Following the intervention, MBCT participants decreased in
their tendency to sustain trains of negative words and increased
their tendency to sustain trains of positive words. Conversely, con-
trols showed the opposite tendency: controls stayed in trains of
negative words for longer, and stayed in trains of positive words
for less time relative to at T1. This indicates that negative asso-
ciations were less available and positive associations were more
available to MBCT participants after their training.
PROBABILITY OF ENDING RECALL
While the valence of the first words recalled indicate initial affec-
tive bias, the valence of words recalled at the end of recall indicate
the contextual drift of a mind state. In comparison to controls,
MBCT participants tended to stop recall less often with nega-
tive words. Decreased stopping with negative words indicates that
MBCT participants are less likely to drift toward or persist in a
negatively valenced mental context.
There is accumulating evidence that mindfulness training
exerts its therapeutic effects by decreasing rumination (Ramel
et al., 2004; Jain et al., 2007; Kingston et al., 2007; Mathew et al.,
2010; Shahar et al., 2010; Heeren and Philippot, 2011). Specifi-
cally, the creators of MBCT theorized that mindfulness training
breaks the high level thematically driven elaboration of repetitive
negative thoughts by redirecting focus to a lower level, concrete
focus such as body sensations (Teasdale et al., 1995; Segal et al.,
2002). Our results give experimental support for the suggestion
that MBCT trains the ability to disengage from self-perpetuating
negative associations held in memory.
While the theorized mechanism of MBCT includes the
improved ability to disengage and thereby weaken negative asso-
ciations, there is no theory supporting an increase in the strength
of positive associations. Another study from our lab demonstrated
that mindfulness training is associated with an increased efficiency
in positive memory recall, which was correlated with improve-
ments in anxiety, depression, and overall well-being (Roberts-
Wolfe et al., 2012). Since depression is characterized not only by









































FIGURE 3 | (A,B) Changes in probability of staying within the same category fromT1 toT2 by valence category (A: positive; B: negative). *p< 0.05, **p<0.001.
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FIGURE 4 | (A,B) Changes in probability of stopping from T1 to T2 by valence category (A: positive; B: negative). *p<0.05, †p<0.1.
affect and inability to sustain it (Watson and Clark, 1988; Heller
et al., 2009), this finding is of high clinical relevance.
On a neural level, the tendency toward excessive, repetitive, and
uncontrolled negative thoughts and memories that are linked to
each other by a common theme, often called rumination but also
characteristic of overgeneral memory, is caused by the combina-
tion of a weak prefrontal cortex and consequently dysregulated
hippocampus and amygdala. The ability to shift mental sets or
disengage from negative emotional information held in memory
is associated with prefrontal control, also called cognitive flexibil-
ity. Our findings are consistent with the idea that mental training
increases the strength of prefrontal attention and executive brain
networks, with improved modulation of the hippocampus and
amygdala (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Creswell et al., 2007;
Farb et al., 2007; Goldin and Gross, 2010; Hölzel et al., 2010; see
Hölzel et al., 2011, for a review).
Our findings are also consistent with models that describe
depression as a progressive sensitization to stress (Segal et al.,
1996, 1999, 2006). In an investigation of affective response to the
TSST (Britton et al., 2012), we found that while the MBCT group
recovered faster from stress, controls showed evidence of stress
sensitization. They returned to the lab for the second TSST with
higher levels of pre-speech anticipatory anxiety than the first TSST.
The pattern of recall dynamics followed a similar pattern: after an
8-week wait-list, controls were more likely to start with a negative
word and less likely to start with a positive word. Controls were
also more likely to have long trains of negative associations and
less likely to have positive trains. Together, these data suggest that
recall dynamics not only can measure the effects of interventions,
but also the progressive vulnerability that puts individuals at risk
for recurrence.
While the current study confirmed our hypotheses about the
effect of mindfulness training on recall dynamics, it also yielded
several other findings that are worth mentioning. First, there has
been much speculation that meditation may improve cognitive
abilities, including memory, but our findings do not support this
idea: MBCT training did not improve overall memory ability (total
words recalled) more than the control condition. In addition,
MBCT did not influence overall affective memory bias, which sug-
gests that using total word counts is not a very sensitive measure
of bias.
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
This study represents an attempt to develop a biologically
informed objective measure of rumination based on validated
computational models. Recall dynamics may offer a more objec-
tive measure than self-reports and a more nuanced and sensitive
measure of affective memory biases that includes the quality of
stickiness or persistence. In addition to this strength, the study has
many limitations. First, our study used many fewer word lists than
typical recall dynamics studies (see Howard and Kahana, 1999),
which limits our reliability and statistical power. Future studies
should use 25 or more lists per participant in order to permit the
use of individual level statistics that assess relationships between
self-reported rumination and recall dynamics.
Second, because the MBSR instructor was also the principal
investigator, she was not blind to the hypothesis and could influ-
ence results by “teaching to the test.” However, in comparison to
both subjective reports and word-count based affective bias mea-
sures, recall dynamics are probably more robust in the face of
demand characteristics or experimenter effects.
Finally, while we found group-level difference in recall dynam-
ics, this study says nothing about mechanisms of action or which
component of MBCT were responsible for the differences. While
we report in terms of the effects of “mindfulness,” the cognitive
therapy component is also a likely candidate for changing pat-
terns of recall associations because its basis is gaining awareness of
thought patterns and changing them.
Although the behavioral results we demonstrate here have weak
statistical power, and should be replicated by other experiments,
we suggest that the methods developed here for analyzing patterns
of associations between words of different valences could be used
to address many questions in the domain of affective function-
ing and memory. They provide an important new perspective on
the study of the emotion-cognition interface, particularly as it is
related to mindfulness.
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Using novel methods for quantifying the memory dynamics
that may underlie rumination, we investigated patterns of mem-
ory recall dynamics before and after MBCT or a wait-list control.
Analysis of recall dynamics suggest that MBCT may weaken the
strength of self-perpetuating negative associations networks that
are responsible for the persistent and “sticky” negative mind states
observed in depression, and increase positive associations that
are lacking in depression. This study also offers a novel biolog-
ically informed, objective method of measuring several indices of
ruminative tendencies.
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